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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2235 
___________ 
 
LARRY STANLEY, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PITTSBURGH; PITTSBURGH BUREAU OF POLICE; 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; LT. SIPPEY 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-01450 
(Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 17, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 26, 2012) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 After arrest and withdrawn prosecution for homicide, Larry Stanley filed a 
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the City of Pittsburgh’s prior policy 
permitting a single officer to submit an Affidavit of Probable Cause without requiring 
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further review violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment to the defendant.  We will affirm.  
I. 
 On June 16, 2003, Stanley was involved in a bar brawl in Pittsburgh that resulted 
in the stabbing death of Ronald Barber, Sr.  Based on the testimony of an eyewitness 
alleging Stanley held Barber while another man stabbed him and identifying Stanley from 
a photo array, Detective Joseph Myers submitted an Affidavit of Probable Cause to the 
county coroner, who issued a warrant for Stanley’s arrest for criminal homicide.  Stanley 
alleges he was not involved in Barber’s death and claims Myers’s Affidavit ignored 
exonerating statements that contradicted the eyewitness testimony.  Stanley was charged 
with criminal homicide but, in the course of a bench trial, the charges were withdrawn 
with prejudice. 
 Stanley then filed this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, alleging that the City of Pittsburgh’s policy at the time of his arrest 
permitting an officer to submit an Affidavit of Probable Cause without any review and on 
the strength of a single witness violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  The District Court 
granted summary judgment to the defendant on the ground that Stanley had presented no 
evidence that the policy had caused the alleged constitutional violation.  Stanley v. City of 
Pittsburgh, No. 9-1450, 2011 WL 1327634 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2011).  Stanley timely 
appealed.1
                                              
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343.  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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II.2
 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations committed 
under color of state law.  Under § 1983, a municipality may not be held vicariously liable 
for the actions of its employees, but may be responsible when a municipal policy or 
custom itself caused the violation in question.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 
658, 694-95 (1978).  To establish liability based on a municipal policy or custom, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate the municipality was “the ‘moving force’ behind the injury 
alleged” by showing that there was a “direct causal link between the municipal action and 
the deprivation of federal rights.”  Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 
(1997).  A plaintiff must also establish that the municipal decision “reflects deliberate 
indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will 
follow the decision.”  Id. at 411.  This is a “stringent standard of fault” that “requir[es] 
proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”  
Id. at 410. 
 
 Stanley’s conclusory allegations cannot satisfy this standard here.  Even if we 
entertain the questionable assertion that the coroner lacked probable cause and Stanley’s 
constitutional rights were violated, Stanley has offered no evidence that this violation 
resulted from the City of Pittsburgh’s policy.  As the District Court noted, neither the 
                                              
2 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.  
N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011).  Summary 
judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  We view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all 
inferences in that party’s favor.  Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
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practice of allowing a coroner to assess probable cause nor the policy permitting a single 
officer to submit an affidavit can be considered the “moving force” behind the alleged 
constitutional violation where Stanley has not shown how these particular policies were 
directly responsible for the issuance of the arrest warrant.  Nor do Stanley’s allegations 
satisfy the “stringent” deliberate indifference standard.  Stanley has offered no evidence 
that the harm he suffered was a known or obvious consequence of the City of 
Pittsburgh’s policy, which did not itself violate any constitutional requirements.  At best, 
Stanley urges us to find municipal liability based on the “generalized . . . risk” that the 
policy made “a violation of rights more likely.”  Brown, 520 U.S. at 410.  But the 
Supreme Court has already stated that such a showing alone does not satisfy the 
deliberate indifference standard, id. at 410-11, and Stanley’s attempt to impute the 
actions of Myers and the coroner to the City of Pittsburgh threatens to collapse the well-
established distinction between municipal liability and respondeat superior liability.  
Because of these legal shortcomings, Stanley’s municipal liability claim fails. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the defendant. 
